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Abstract Cloud storage services have become ubiquitous.
A large number of individuals and organizations are using
them to store and share data, taking the benefits of mobility
and affordability offered by these services. However,
secure management of data in cloud storage services, more
specifically supporting multi-party sharing in the context of
a collaboration, is a challenging problem. The problem is
further exacerbated if the data owner does not have any
trust on the cloud storage providers and the data need
regular updates from collaborating parties. A number of
cryptographically enforced secure cloud storage solutions
have been proposed to address this problem. One of the key
issues with these solutions is the revocation of access to
data for invalid users without moving the data (in the era of
big data) and relying on the cloud service providers. In this
paper, we introduce a cloud storage system that offers
cryptographically enforced security. In contrast to other
cryptographically protected cloud storage systems, our
system supports a fine-grained access control mechanism
and allows flexible revocations of invalid users without
moving the data and relying on the cloud service providers.
Our system employs an attribute-based encryption tech-
nique to support a complex access structure that allows a
user to define human readable access policies to the data in
the cloud storage. In addition, our system supports a flex-
ible revocation scheme that can revoke invalid users
directly by updating the revoked users’ list or indirectly by
updating an epoch counter. The system administrator can
choose one of these options flexibly depending on the
needs. Our system also allows authorized users to update
the encrypted data, and any users accessing such updated
data in future can verify whether the data are modified by
authorized users.
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1 Introduction
Cloud storage services are widely used by individuals and
organizations due to the inherent benefits offered by them;
for example, affordability, availability, mobility. Global-
ization and outsourcing in modern organizations and the
increasing adoption of the social web in individual’s life
have increased the needs of sharing data in a collaborative
environment. For example, cloud storage services such as
DropBox [3], Google Drive [4] and Microsoft OneDrive
[5] have been widely used. In such services, users must rely
on the service-level agreement (SLA) to entrust cloud
service providers to provide a level of protection to their
data. However, SLA-based data protection is vulnerable to
different types of threats ranging from legal to ethical.
Examples of such threats include data sovereignty, third-
party data exploitation, insider attack. This means users
cannot trust these cloud service providers for their data.
Hence, protecting data on such widely used cloud storage
solutions remains a primary concern to their users. If the
problem is left unaddressed, cloud storage providers might
fail to keep users’ data secure and a large amount of private
and sensitive data might be revealed with very high con-
sequential financial, reputational and operational impact on
both users and cloud storage providers.
One of the most promising solutions to protect the data
in cloud storage is encryption. A user encrypts the data
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before uploading it to the cloud and decrypts the data after
it is downloaded. An untrusted cloud storage provider can
only see the encrypted data. A number of solutions have
been proposed [28, 40, 43] using the above-explained
cryptographic method to protect user’s data from an
untrusted cloud storage. These simple solutions do not
support multi-party collaboration between organizations
and individuals without a help from a trusted third party.
To address this shortcoming, attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [14, 34] techniques are often utilized in data storage
[8, 29, 39, 41, 44] to support a more fine-grained access
control mechanism. ABE is a public key cryptographic
system, in which a user encrypts the data using the public
keys which are shared with other users so that they can
decrypt the encrypted data using their private keys. Par-
ticularly, users in ABE do not have unique keys as the
traditional public key systems. Instead, they have a key
associated with their properties. A user can set a complex
access policy based on attributes defined in a system for the
encrypted data. Only users with attributes that satisfy the
access policy can decrypt the encrypted data. The access
policy is easy to express and understand by users since
ABE uses a Boolean formula as an access policy. There-
fore, we adopted an ABE scheme in our system.
One of the challenging problems in applying ABE to
cloud storage systems is managing an up-to-date access
control list. For example, a user who was once granted
access to the data might not be able to access the data due
to various reasons such as change in a security level,
leaving an organization or becoming malicious. In such
cases, the data owner must be able to revoke access to any
encrypted data for invalid users. Two possible revocation
methods can be considered. The first is an indirect revo-
cation that revokes users by redistributing keys only to
valid users after updating ciphertext. The second is a direct
revocation in which the system revokes access to ciphertext
for invalid users by updating ciphertext and revocation list
without key redistributions. In our system, we employ both
methods to support a flexible user revocation.
An indirect revocation can be achieved in cloud storage
solutions using existing ABE-based techniques (e.g., an
epoch counter as proposed in [39]). When a user becomes
invalid or there is a need to revoke access for a user, the
system first increases the epoch counter in the user’s key;
then updates the corresponding ciphertext using the
increased counter; and finally redistributes keys containing
the new epoch counter to all valid users. Since invalid users
do not receive a key with the new epoch counter, their
access to the corresponding data is automatically revoked.
However, this revocation method requires the redistribu-
tion of new keys to all users every time when a user
becomes invalid. Hence, this may cause inefficiency in the
system if the revocation events occur frequently.
A direct revocation mechanism can achieve a user
revocation without redistributing users’ private keys. A
system can revoke invalid users only by updating a
ciphertext and an associated revocation list. After updating
the ciphertext, users in the revocation list cannot decrypt
the updated ciphertext while other users not in the revo-
cation list still can decrypt it using their pre-owned keys.
Broadcast encryption [9, 11, 12, 19] and revocation
schemes [13, 20, 26] can be utilized to support direct
revocation in the system. Broadcast encryption keeps an
access list instead of a revocation list. For a system
requiring a more fine-grained access control, non-mono-
tonic ABE [30, 37, 42] is used. These schemes enable to
revoke certain attributes in an access policy using the
negation. The disadvantage of these direct revocation
mechanisms is that the system becomes inefficient as the
time required for encryption/decryption increases propor-
tionally to the number of revoked attributes.
Currently, systems which support a fine-grained access
control through ABE provide either direct user revocation
[6, 23] or indirect user revocation [21, 38, 39]. However, as
we pointed out earlier that both revocation techniques have
their own advantages and disadvantages. For example,
indirect revocation method does not need to keep a long
revocation list, but it needs to redistribute keys when the
system revokes an invalid user. Similarly, direct revocation
method does not need to redistribute keys to all users, but
may need to maintain a long revocation list which makes
the system inefficient.
In this paper, we introduce a system that offers a cryp-
tographically enforced access control method on an
untrusted cloud storage. When a user uploads a file to a
cloud storage service, our system takes over the file and
encrypts it with a secret symmetric key (e.g., AES). It then
encrypts the secret key separately using an ABE scheme.
To maintain the integrity of the encrypted data, our system
cryptographically signs both ciphertexts. We call the
encrypted file and the encrypted key as data-block and
meta-file, respectively. In our system, only users who sat-
isfy the access policies in meta-file can decrypt the secret
key. Hence, the access control policies can be enforced
without any help from the cloud storage services, and the
data file is cryptographically protected. In addition to
encrypted secret key, the meta-file contains features that
support a hybrid key revocation mechanism which allows
both direct and indirect revocation of users. The use of a
particular revocation method at any time is determined by
the system based on its own requirements (e.g., efficiency).
Our system also supports updates in multi-party collabo-
ration environment through writers access control provided
in the meta-file. It allows content updates from authorized
users with a write access. Our system works with any third-
party cloud storage providers such as DropBox, Google
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Drive and Microsoft OneDrive without revealing any
confidential information to those cloud storage providers.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the security goals and functional features of our
system. In Sect. 3, we provide a background of crypto-
graphic primitives used by our system. The detailed
working of the system is described in Sects. 5 and 6. In
Sect. 7, implementation results of our system are provided.
This is followed by a brief summary of related works in




Through our system, we aim to provide an access control
including both readers and writers control to the data stored
in the cloud. Therefore, our system prevents unauthorized
users including the cloud provider to read any plain texts of
the files that are stored in the cloud. Authorized users can
always access and decrypt the files. Though our system
does not prevent the encrypted data in the cloud to be
modified or replaced by malicious readers or cloud provi-
ders, it can detect such modification or replacement from
unauthorized writers. We describe the security goals of our
system more formally in terms of confidentiality, integrity
and availability (CIA) as follows.
For confidentiality of the data, we define the following
security functions:
Conf.1 Our system directly revokes invalid users
without redistribution of keys when they are detected.
The revoked users no longer can decrypt the encrypted
data.
Conf.2 Our system indirectly revokes invalid users by
redistributing new keys only to valid users. The revoked
users no longer can decrypt the encrypted data
Conf.3 Unauthorized users including a cloud storage
provider cannot access the plain text of the encrypted file
in the cloud.
For Integrity of the data, we define the following security
function:
Int.1 Modification or replacement of the encrypted file
from unauthorized users is detectable.
For Availability of the data, we define the following
security functions:
Ava.1 Authorized users can decrypt the encrypted data.
The access policy can be fine-grained based on users’
attributes.
Ava.2 Authorized users can modify the encrypted data.
2.2 Functional Goals
In addition to the security goals defined above, our system
also provides the following distinctive functional features:
Flexible User Revocation Our system uses a hybrid
revocation mechanism that supports a fine-grained
access control with both direct and indirect user
revocations. This is achieved by maintaining both a
revocation list and an epoch counter. Our system can
revoke users by updating their attributes in the revoca-
tion list. If the revocation list becomes too long, the
epoch counter is increased and then new keys with
increased counter are redistributed to all valid users and
the revocation list is reset. The decision on which
method to use at a particular time depends on the system;
hence, the system has an in-built flexibility to select one
of them as required.
Support for Collaboration Our system supports multi-
party collaborations by providing an access control for
both readers (users who can only read the content in
files) and writers (who can read and update the content in
files). This is possible in our system as it employs an
ABE to support a fine-grained access control mechanism
and a cryptographic signature to support the modifica-
tion of authorized writers. The access policies are
associated with users’ properties that are used to control
readers list and reflect the revocation list. An access
policy and a writers list are bundled together with an
encrypted data as plain text, but any malicious changes
to them are detectable by the system and the confiden-
tiality and the integrity of the data are maintained.
No Third-Party Key Management Server (KMS) Our
system does not need a third-party key management
server that is normally used to store all decryption keys
of the encrypted files. The decryption keys are uploaded
in the cloud as a meta-file together with the correspond-
ing data, and they are cryptographically protected. This
mitigates the problem of key management, one of the
hardest part of cryptography and often the Achilles’ heel
of an otherwise secure system.
It is worth noting that our system uses an administrator
who takes a role of Private Key Generator (PKG) and
updates ciphertext and users’ private keys when users are
revoked. One may think that this is equivalent to a key
management server, but the role of the administrator is
limited in our system. For example, a user can download
the data from a cloud storage and decrypt it without any
help from the administrator. In contrast to the systems that
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use the key management server, a user does not need to
receive any cryptographic key from the administrator every
time the data are accessed. In addition, a user can upload a
file directly to the cloud and other users can access this file
without a confirmation from the administrator if the user
explicitly made their collaborators aware of the existence
of such file. Furthermore, a user does not need to provide
any cryptographic key through the secure channel to the
administrator. Therefore, the attack to the administrator
such as Denial of Service (DoS) is less effective than other
systems that use a centralized authority such as KMS and a
proxy server. It is also important to note that the admin-
istrator does not have any keys except its own private key;
this means the burden of key management is removed from
the administrator as it does not need any secure database to
store keys.
3 Overview of Cryptographic Primitives
3.1 Overview of ABE
Our system adopted attribute-based encryption [34] to
support a fine-grained access policy. ABE system is gen-
erally classified into two types based on the location of an
access policy employed [14]: key policy attribute-based
encryption (KP-ABE) and ciphertext policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE). In CP-ABE, an access policy is
implemented into the ciphertext and private keys are gen-
erated based on a key owner’s attributes. Therefore, CP-
ABE is a more suitable model for a cloud storage since
each user has a key that is created based on their own
attributes. The data in the cloud storage are encrypted
based on an access policy consisting of those users’
attributes.
In our system, we utilize an ABE scheme [42] that
supports non-monotonic access structure (NM-CP-ABE).
A non-monotonic access structure provides a richer access
policy by allowing negation of attributes in the policy. For
example, professors can include ‘‘NOT Student’’ in an
access policy to revoke student users when they encrypt the
data.
Some schemes defined in [6, 23] can also revoke an
attribute, but only a special attribute such as an identity.
That is, if the system wants to revoke a group of people in
the access list, the revocation scheme [6, 23] needs to add
all identities of revoked users in a revocation list. However,
in NM-CP-ABE, a system can simply negate a common
attribute they share. For example, if a system wants to
revoke students to access a certain data, a system can
simply add ‘‘NOT Student’’ instead of adding all students’
identities in the revocation list.
In particular, we utilize the NM-CP-ABE suggested by
Yamada et al. [42]. This scheme achieves the negation by
division. If a user has a revoked attribute, one of the
divisors becomes 0 to prevent the decryption. More
specifically, the decryption process needs the following




where E(i, j) is an intermediate result derived by paring
computation of a user’s key and a ciphertext and k is the
number of attributes the user has. Therefore, if the user has
an attribute equals to Atti, the decryption process fails. The
above equation shows that the computation of revocation is
O(nk), where n is the number of negated attributes. This
clearly demonstrates that the system becomes gradually
inefficient as the number of negated (i.e., revoked) attri-
butes increases.
In addition to the negation property in the NM-CP-ABE
scheme which enables direct revocation, we also use an
epoch counter for indirect revocation. We define an epoch
counter as a standard attribute and apply it as a mandatory
condition to all access policies. In particular, the NM-CP-
ABE scheme proposed in [42] supports a large universe of
attributes, which is suitable for indirect revocation. Since
we define an epoch counter as a standard attribute, the size
of the universe is quite important. If the size of the universe
of attributes that the system supports is small and has to be
fixed at the setup time, the whole system requires to be
reset when the epoch counter is reached to the upper bound
which is fixed. Since [42] supports the arbitrary size for the
epoch counter, this problem does not occur in our system.
Therefore, the unbounded nature of these attributes makes
the system more practical in real-life applications.
3.2 Overview of Identity-Based Signature
The signature scheme is used to achieve the integrity
security goal in our system. Particularly, it is used to
control a writer’s role in our system. When a user (i.e.,
uploader) uploads a new data to the cloud storage, the
administrator must guarantee that this uploaded file is from
the original uploader. This can be verified by the signature
of the uploader. After the verification, the administrator’s
signature replaces the uploader’s signature in the meta-file
to avoid a further change. However, when the data are
modified, the encrypted data are re-signed by the modifier,
but the meta-file remains the same. Therefore, a reader of
the data can verify at any time that the current version of
the data is valid using the signatures on the data-block and
meta-file in conjunction with writers list in meta-file.
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In order to achieve the functional requirements of the
signature scheme described above, we employ an identity-
based signature scheme [35]. In an identity-based signature
scheme, a signer has a signing key (SKID) associated with
its identity and a verifier has a verification key (VK). Once
the data are signed by a signer using its signing key, a
verifier can check the integrity of the signed data together
with the signer’s identity by verifying the signature on the
data.
There are a number of identity-based signature schemes
[16, 31, 32] in the literature to support our requirements.
We use the scheme defined in [31] to implement our sys-
tem due to its simple structure. In this scheme, a user has a
key element Did which is randomization of the hash value
of its identity Qid (i.e., Did ¼ Qsid where s is a random
value). Then, P and Ps are given as a public value. Since all
users can calculate Qid, they can verify the signature using
the public values P and Ps via pairing computations.
3.3 Overview of Key Homomorphic Encryption
A key homomorphic encryption [10, 39] is used to provide
protection from a cached key, which is explained further in
a later section. A key homomorphic encryption facilitates
the update on the encrypted data using a new symmetric
key without decrypting and re-encrypting it. To use the key
homomorphism with our symmetric encryption, we utilize
a key homomorphic pseudorandom function F as the
symmetric encryption algorithm. Using this function, we
encrypt the plain text M using a stream cipher. The plain
text M is encrypted as M  FðK; xÞ, where K is a symmetric
key and x is a nonce such as an initial vector. Then, the
symmetric key K can be updated to K 0 by calculating K^ ¼
K 0  K and FðK^; xÞ. Due to the key homomorphism,
M  FðK 0; xÞ ¼ M  FðK þ K^; xÞ ¼ M  FðK; xÞ  FðK^; xÞ:
Therefore, the data-block can be updated as a new
ciphertext with a new key (K 0) without the need to decrypt
and re-encrypt it.
4 Our Proposed System
4.1 Description of System
As our system aims to provide an access control for the
data in an untrusted cloud, the data in the system should be
self-defendable from untrusted cloud and malicious users
but still be able to share among authorized users in a col-
laborative environment. Figure 1 shows a simple archi-
tecture of our system. Although our system does not
require a key management server, we need an administrator
who maintains the system as discussed earlier. Since we are
using a centralized cryptographic primitive, someone
should generate keys for users and distribute them. The
administrator takes this role. The administrator also needs
to update the ciphertext of meta-file if users are revoked. In
our system, the administrator must have a master key to
decrypt all data to update the meta-file ciphertext when a
user is revoked. A master key can be a private key based on
the administrator’s identity in NM-CP-ABE. All users must
allow this identity to have an access when they encrypt
data. However, protecting a single key is easier than
maintaining a key management server.
Our system can be implemented as an application that
sits between the operating system (e.g., Windows, Linux)
and cloud storage application installed in user’s device as
shown in Fig. 2. In an essence, our application takes over a
data stream between a cloud application and an operating
system. A cloud application is provided by the cloud
storage provider to store/retrieve data to/from the cloud
(e.g., an application provided by DropBox). For example, if
a user wants to upload a file to the cloud storage, our
Fig. 1 Architecture of our system
Fig. 2 Implementation in user’s device
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application takes the file and encrypts it and sends the
encrypted file to the cloud application, which in turn stores
the encrypted file to the cloud storage. Similarly, when a
file is downloaded from the cloud storage, our application
receives the encrypted file from a cloud application before
it reaches the user. Our application decrypts the file using a
user’s private key and outputs to the user as a decrypted
file.
We utilize an NM-CP-ABE scheme in our system. Each
user has attributes including identity (ID) and epoch
counter. The system uses these attributes to define an
access control policy. Any Boolean formula can be used as
an access policy. For example, one can define an access
policy as ((‘‘Computer Science’’ AND ‘‘Student’’) OR
‘‘Professor’’) to allow an access to students who study
computer science or any professors. In addition, the NM-
CP-ABE scheme allows negation of properties. For
example, we can use ‘‘NOT Student’’ in an access policy
not to allow access particularly for all students. For revo-
cation purpose, we use an epoch counter, which is a
standard attribute in our system. It works exactly like other
attributes, but the epoch counter is mandatory for any
access policy. This can be done by binding the value of the
epoch counter and an access policy by AND. For example,
an access policy with the mandatory epoch counter can be
defined as (‘‘1010’’ AND ((‘‘Computer Science’’ AND
‘‘Student’’) OR ‘‘Professor’’)), where ‘‘1010’’ is the current
value of the epoch counter.
In order to support collaboration, our scheme also allows
the data modification from authorized users (we refer them
as writers). This means we need to have a proper protection
mechanism in place to prevent unauthorized modifications.
As our system operates in the environment where the cloud
storage providers are untrusted, the deletion and modifi-
cation of data in the cloud are unavoidable. However, the
system always able to detect unauthorized modifications. In
order to achieve this, we use writers’ list in the meta-file
and protect the integrity of this list using cryptographic
signatures from the data owner and administrator. The
encrypted data in the data-block is also signed by the one
who creates/modifies the data most recently. Using these
signatures and writers list, users of data can verify at any
time whether the data are modified by an authorized writer.
This is done by checking whether a data signer is a valid
writer.
4.2 Components of the System
Figure 1 shows different components of our systems such
as users, cloud storage and the administrator. We next
describe their roles in the overall operation of the system.
4.2.1 Users
Users in our system include authorized devices (owned by
individuals) that can download the encrypted data and
upload a new or modified data. Examples of devices
include laptops, smart phones, PCs. These devices must be
powerful enough to compute encryption and decryption
under the NM-CP-ABE scheme.
Each user has its own secret key which is created based
on their attributes and Identity, and public keys to be used
to encrypt and decrypt the data. In addition, each user has
its own signing key which is uniquely allocated to its
identity and a verification key to verify the signatures
signed by other users.
4.2.2 A Cloud Storage
A cloud storage is the remote storage provided by cloud
providers that users can upload their data to share with
others and also download the data shared by others. We
assume that the cloud storage maintains the consistency of
the stored data and provides a reasonable service to users.
Cloud storage providers may provide some mechanisms to
protect data from potential data loss and an unauthorized
access to the stored data via SLA. It is important to note
that an access control mechanism in our system does not
depend on the underlying supports provided by cloud
providers. In our system, any information in encrypted data
is not revealed to cloud storage providers even when the
data are updated and created.
4.2.3 Administrator
Administrator can be one of the users, but it performs a
number of maintenance activities for the data stored in the
cloud storage as follows:
Key generation and distribution To set up the system,
the administrator generates public and private keys using
the NM-CP-ABE scheme, and signing and verification
keys using the signature scheme discussed earlier. The
administrator generates private keys for all users
including itself based on their identities and attributes.
Then, it distributes the generated keys to corresponding
users. The details of key generation and distribution
scheme are not covered in this paper. We assume that
there exists a secure channel between the administrator
and other users for key distribution. That is, keys are
delivered securely without leaking them to the cloud
service providers or malicious users. The key generation
and distribution activity are also performed during the
indirect revocation. The administrator increases the
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epoch counter for new keys and redistributes them only
to valid users.
Approval of a new data When a new data are uploaded
into the system, the data contain writers list that is signed
by the uploader’s identity. An uploader is a user who
uploads the data to the cloud storage. However, other
users of this data do not know whether the uploader of
the data is valid. For example, the uploader could be any
reader who can decrypt the file. A reader may generate a
new data with a new access policy and writers list and
replace the original data. To avoid this unauthorized
upload, the meta-file should be re-signed by the admin-
istrator, which is trusted by all users, at the beginning.
That means the uploader sends a notification to the
administrator with a file index when new data are
uploaded. Then, the administrator signs these initial data
as soon as they are uploaded.
Updating meta-file When a revocation of users is
requested, the administrator updates the access to data
either by updating the corresponding revocation list or
by increasing the corresponding epoch counter. In our
system, it is not necessary to re-encrypt the entire data.
We will explain it further in a later section. However, it
should re-encrypts the meta-file with a new policy (i.e.,
either with a new revocation list or with a new epoch
counter). This re-encryption process also requires the
decryption of a meta-file since the administrator does not
store any individual key for the data-blocks. It is thus
necessary for an administrator to have a key which can
decrypt all meta-files.
5 System Design
5.1 Data-Block and Meta-File Creation
In this subsection, we aim to provide the detailed
description of data-block and meta-file, including how they
are created. Figure 3 shows the overall structure of the
data-block and the corresponding meta-file. We use a
symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES), a NM-CP-
ABE scheme [23] and an identity-based signature
scheme [32] to realize our system. Before data are uploa-
ded to the cloud storage, each user encrypts the data using
the symmetric encryption algorithm with a randomly gen-
erated key and signed with the file owner’s ID. The sym-
metric key is not related to user’s ID and used only once.
We call this encrypted and signed data a data-block.
Together with a data-block, a meta-file is created. The
meta-file contains the encryption of the symmetric key. It is
encrypted using the NM-CP-ABE scheme to support
complex access control policies. The meta-file also
includes an access policy and writers list as shown in
Fig. 3. All those components of meta-file are singed by an
uploader’s identity.
5.2 Assigning Identities and Attributes
In our system, each user has a number of attributes
including identity and epoch counter. An identity is
uniquely assigned to each user. Identity attribute is used for
a revocation. When a user becomes invalid, it is a quite
difficult sometimes to set up a policy to revoke only a
single user since its attributes may be common with other
users. In this case, the identity attribute provides a simple
way to revoke them. Since the scheme we adopted supports
a large universe of attributes, using user’s identity as an
attribute does not cause a serious scalability problem. In
addition, user’s identity is also used to sign the data.
Hence, associated with identity, each user receives two
cryptographic parameters: encryption key element for ABE
scheme and signing key for the signature. A user must
always sign the data using the assigned signing key after
the encrypted data are modified.
5.3 Data Creation
To upload a file into the cloud storage, a user creates a
meta-file and a data-block using the following steps:
1. First, a user generates a symmetric key (Keysym) using
a random number generator and encrypts the data.
2. After the data are encrypted, the user generates a
unique index. The index is then appended to the
encrypted data. The user then generates a signature of
the index and encrypted data with its signing key
(SKID). The signature is also appended to the data.
Therefore, a data-block consisting of an index, an
encrypted data and a signature is generated (see
Fig. 3).
3. The user uploads the data-block to a cloud storage.
4. The user then sets up an access policy for the data-
block. In order to do this, the user checks the
revocation list and the current epoch counter in the
system. This information can be transmitted from the
Fig. 3 Diagrams of a data-block and a meta-file
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administrator to the user in plain text, but with the
administrator’s signature (to check the integrity of the
data received). The user checks whether the revocation
list and the epoch counter are valid by verifying the
administrator’s signature using VK.
5. The user encrypts the symmetric key using the NM-
CP-ABE scheme with PK. It should be noted that the
output also must contain the access policy for decryp-
tion. The user also appends the index which is
allocated to the data-block and a writers list to the
encrypted symmetric key.
6. The user then generates a signature of the index, the
access policy, the writers list and the encrypted key. It
is then appended by the signature (see Fig. 3). This is
called a meta-file. The user uploads the meta-file and
sends the administrator the index of a new file.
7. If the administrator is notified that a new file is
uploaded, the administrator downloads the meta-file,
verifies the signature of the creator and replaces the
signature on the meta-file by its own signature and re-
uploads the signed meta-file to the cloud.
In summary, our system uploads a file to the cloud by
uploading the corresponding data-block and meta-file.
They can be uploaded separately for the efficiency reason,
as those processes can be performed in parallel. We also
replace the data owner’s signature by the administrator’s
signature. Both signatures are required. The administrator
must be able to check whether the meta-file is not replaced
by any other users by verifying the uploader’s signature
before it re-signs the meta-file. Therefore, other users can
confirm that the meta-file is the same as the original created
by the data owner using the administrator’s signature.
5.4 Data Read
To read the data from the cloud storage, a user must
decrypt both meta-file and data-block corresponding to the
data.
1. A user first downloads both meta-file and data-block
corresponding to the file. The meta-file is first down-
loaded. Therefore, steps 2 and 3 can be performed
while the data-block is being downloaded.
2. The user verifies the signature of the meta-file using
VK to check the integrity of the meta-file and the
signer of the meta-file. If the signature is forged, the
user reports it to the administrator.
3. The user then reads the access policy in the meta-file to
check whether it is a valid user. If the user is valid, it
decrypts the encrypted key using SKAtt and PK to get
Keysym. Otherwise, it aborts.
4. The user decrypts the encrypted data in the data-block
using Keysym retrieved from the meta-file.
5.5 Data Modification
Our system allows a modification of the data by authorized
users. Our system does not require the modification of the
corresponding meta-file as the symmetric key encrypted in
the meta-file remains unchanged while the corresponding
data-block is changed.
1. When an authorized user wants to replace or write
data, the user reads the data as described in the
previous subsection.
2. After the data are modified, the user re-encrypts the
modified data with the same symmetric key.
3. The user signs the newly encrypted data using its
signing key and then uploads the data to the cloud
storage.
During the modification, we need to consider the cached
key problem, which will be described further in the next
section.
5.6 Revoking Users
Our system revokes users in two different ways as
explained earlier: direct and indirect. When a malicious
user is detected or a revocation request is received, the
administrator uses either direct or indirect revocation
method to revoke the user. For a direct revocation, the
administrator revokes users as follows:
1. The administrator downloads all meta-files which are
accessible from those users from the cloud and
decrypts them to get the symmetric keys for the
corresponding data-blocks.
2. The administrator updates the access policies in all
meta-files by adding invalid users or attributes and re-
encrypts the meta-files.
3. The administrator then updates the revocation list it
has.
It should be noted that the above steps are executed in the
administrator’s device. Hence, the data are still protected
from the cloud. Furthermore, all users’ keys remain the
same. It means redistribution of keys is not necessary in
direct revocation. For an indirect revocation, the admin-
istrator revokes users as follows:
1. The administrator generates new keys for all valid
users. Users’ attributes in those new keys are the
same as the previous keys except the epoch counter.
All keys share the same epoch counter which is
increased by 1.
2. The administrator downloads all meta-files from the
cloud storage and decrypts them to get the symmetric
keys for the corresponding encrypted data-block.
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3. The administrator increases the epoch counter by 1,
resets the revocation list and re-encrypts them with
the updated epoch counter and the new revocation
list.
4. After the meta-file is updated, it distributes new private
secret keys to all users except invalid users.
Since all meta-files are updated with the increased epoch
counter, users who do not receive key updates cannot
decrypt the meta-file. Similar to the direct revocation, the
cloud storage providers cannot access the data while exe-
cuting the above steps.
6 Security Analysis
We perform the security analysis to explain how our sys-
tem satisfies the confidentiality, integrity and availability
properties defined in Sect. 2.
Conf.1 Our system supports the direct revocation using
the NM-CP-ABE scheme. Since users in the revocation
list are negated in access policies of all meta-files by re-
encryption, they no longer can decrypt the meta-files.
Hence, they cannot obtain the symmetric keys to decrypt
encrypted data-blocks.
Conf.2 Our system supports the indirect revocation
using an epoch counter. Since the revoked users do not
have a key element associated with an increased epoch
counter, they no longer can decrypt meta-files which are
re-encrypted using the up-to-date epoch counter. It
implies that they do not have the symmetric keys to
decrypt the corresponding encrypted data-blocks. Hence,
the encrypted data remain confidential.
Conf.3 An unauthorized user and the cloud storage
providers do not have a valid key to decrypt any meta-
files since they are either negated in the access policy or
not have an up-to-date epoch counter as an attribute.
Therefore, they cannot get the symmetric key to decrypt
any data-block in the cloud. Therefore, the plain text of
the data-blocks cannot be revealed to them.
Int.1 When an unauthorized user modifies or replaces
the data-block, it is detected by the signature scheme. If
an unauthorized user signs with its identity to bypass the
integrity check, the readers still can detect it as the
writers’ list in the meta-file is protected by the admin-
istrator’s signature.
Ava.1 An authorized user can decrypt the encrypted key
in the meta-file. Since the NM-CP-ABE scheme is used
to encrypt the key, authorized users can access the keys
through a fine-grained access control mechanism sup-
ported by the scheme. With the decrypted symmetric
key, a user can decrypt the encrypted data in a data-
block.
Ava.2 Authorized writers can read the data to modify.
They have a key to decrypt the encrypted data in a data-
block. Therefore, after they modify the decrypted data,
they can encrypt the data with the same key and sign the
new data-block by their identity. Since the encryption
key of the data-block is the same key which is encrypted
in the meta-file and the authorized writer’s identity is in
the writers’ list, the generated data-block is valid.
6.1 A Cached Key Problem
Before the system updates the meta-files to revoke mali-
cious users, the malicious users may cache the symmetric
keys to use them after they are revoked. Since the sym-
metric keys remain the same after the meta-files are
updated, they still can access the plain text of the encrypted
data even after they are revoked. It is also important to note
that the encrypted data are modified by authorized writers
without changing the symmetric key. This means they even
can read the future modifications of the data using the
cached keys. We refer this as a cached key problem. To
prevent this problem, we update the symmetric key which
is encrypted in a meta-file. The change of the symmetric
key implies the need to change the encrypted data (i.e., re-
encryption). However, decrypting and re-encrypting all
data-blocks are a huge burden to the system. To address
this problem, we use a key homomorphic algorithm [10] as
suggested by Sieve [39] to improve the efficiency of the
system. If we use the key homomorphic algorithm,
decryption and re-encryption of all data-blocks are not
needed. Instead, it only needs to regenerate a fresh ran-
domness to update the encrypted data in a data-block.
Moreover, the process does not reveal the plaintext of the
encrypted data to the cloud since it does not decrypt the
data-block. This update of the symmetric encryption is
triggered after the detection of a malicious user. Therefore,
the update is performed by the administrator. The admin-
istrator is able to distinguish files which were accessible
from revoked users and performs the update selectively to
those files.
7 Evaluations
We have implemented our system and performs its evalu-
ation. We utilized the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC)
library [24] and PyCrypto [22] to implement our system.
PBC library uses GMP library [1] for mathematical com-
putation. We measured the time to run the NM-CP-ABE
scheme [42], identity-based signature scheme [31],
SHA256 and AES. It should be noted that our measure-
ments are for individual components. However, using our
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results we can approximate the time to generate the meta-
file and data-block. For example, to upload a single-file, a
user needs to perform one NM-CP-ABE scheme encryp-
tion, one AES encryption, two SHA256 hash and two
signing.
We implemented our system in Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
running on VirtualBox [2]. We only allocated 4-GB
memory and 2 processors to run for Ubuntu on the laptop
having 16-GB memory and Intel i7 processor. We evalu-
ated the NM-CP-ABE and identity-based signature
schemes using PBC with a type A pairing and implemented
hash function (SHA256) and symmetric algorithm
(AES256-CBC mode) using PyCrypto.
To evaluate the NM-CP-ABE scheme, we gradually
increased the number of attributes in keys and ciphertext.
Since the NM-CP-ABE scheme supports a large universe
of attributes, the execution time of setup algorithm does not
depend on the number of attributes. In our experiment, it
takes only 16.6 ms. The time to run other algorithms (e.g.,
key generation and encryption) increases linearly with the
number of attributes used in the algorithms. Table 1 shows
the time lapsed to generate a key and a ciphertext. More
precisely, the number of attributes in encryption means that
the number of rows in an access matrix used for the
encryption. Decryption process only uses 3 attributes to
grant an access, which includes one attribute for access and
two attributes for revocation. Although the number of rows
used for decryption is fixed, the computation time for
decryption increases linearly since the decryption process
is also linear to the number of attributes a user has.
We also evaluated the signature scheme of [31], which
is adopted in our system. The implementation of this
scheme is already given as an example in PBC. We ran this
implementation and measured the time of each algorithm
consisting of the signature scheme, separately. The results
are shown in Table 2.
We additionally implemented SHA256 and AES algo-
rithms using PyCrypto. We measured the running time
against the different data sizes. Table 3 shows the results. It
is worth noting that the running time of the NM-CP-ABE
and signature schemes are not impacted by the size of a
file. They are only encrypting AES keys (NM-CP-ABE) or
signing hash outputs (signature).
8 Related Works
There are a number of systems [28, 29, 40, 43] that use
cryptographic techniques to protect data in a cloud storage.
In these systems, the data in the cloud are encrypted, but
the access policies are not protected cryptographically.
Those systems use a trusted third party such as a key
management server or a proxy server to manage the access
control. Furthermore, the availability of the system
depends on the availability of both the key management
sever and cloud data storage.
ABE was often used to support a complicated access
policy in the cloud storage services [8, 29, 44]. However,
schemes like [8, 44] do not support user revocations. That is,
if there is a malicious user detected in the system, they have
to reset their encryption system to revoke the user. Systems
like [29] allow a revocation, but it requires a third party (i.e.,
a distributed hash table) to support the revocation.
An attribute-based encryption system is already equip-
ped with a direct revocation [6, 17, 23] and an indirect
revocation [33, 39] methods. In the direct revocation
mechanism, it uses a revocation list; users in the list cannot
decrypt ciphertext as their access is revoked. In all of these
schemes, a length of ciphertext and a computation of
decryption increase linearly [6, 17, 27] or sublinearly [23]
with the number of revoked users. The revocation is
applicable only to users’ identities. Those identities cannot
be used for allowing access in an access policy unless it
additionally defines a new identity as a standard attribute.
In an indirect revocation system, it uses a counter to
revoke users’ access to the data. This counter is applied as
a mandatory condition to all access policies by setting a
policy like ‘‘(counter) AND (access policy)’’. Sahai
et al. [33] additionally shows that the revocation can also
be performed by a third party without revealing any secret
using a ciphertext delegation and piecewise private keys.
However, their scheme still needs key updates to allow
valid users to decrypt the updated ciphertext.
Table 1 Evaluation of NM-CP-ABE [42]
] of Att. KeyGen (ms) Encryption (ms) Decryption (ms)
5 61 49.4 53.6
10 101.8 86.6 87
15 151.2 124.6 116.8
20 199.6 153.8 149.4
Table 2 Evaluation of identity-
based signature [31]
KeyGen Sign Verification
16.8 ms 8.8 ms 7.45 ms
Table 3 Evaluation of SHA256 and AES
The size of data SHA256 (ms) AES.Enc (ms) AES.Dec (ms)
45 kbytes 0.3 1.2 1.5
540 kbytes 2.8 10.0 11.1
1.1 mbytes 8.7 19.8 19.2
2.2 mbytes 12.7 23.5 27.6
3.1 mbytes 26.7 34.4 43.3
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Predicate encryption (PE) is another approach used for
access control. However, a Boolean policy in PE must be
converted into a polynomial to support the access control
[18]; this puts an additional burden on computations. PE
schemes [7, 18, 36] require the fixed maximum degree of
polynomial which restricts the size of access policy.
GORAM and A-GORAM were introduced in [25] using PE
that supports attribute-hiding to provide a stronger privacy.
Therefore, a cloud server does not know the access policies
that are applied to the data. They also support to read and
write the data shared in the cloud like ours, but these
systems do not support a user revocation.
Li et al. [21] suggested a solution comparable to our
scheme for personal health records. It supports a fine-
grained access control using ABE, user revocation and
writers’ access control. Major difference from our system
is that they utilized a multi-authority ABE based on KP-
ABE. Therefore, in their system, a ciphertext is encrypted
based on a set of attributes and an access policy is in a
user’s key. This means it does not provide a flexible
revocation like ours. Furthermore, their system needs key
updates when a user is revoked.
Very recently, the cloud system Seive [39] was intro-
duced. Data in Sieve system are also protected crypto-
graphically. Seive allows a fine-grained access control.
However, Seive does not allow a user to modify the data.
Furthermore, it only uses indirect revocation, which means
it needs to redistribute the key when users are revoked.
AAuth [38] is a variant of OAuth [15]. It applied ABE to
OAuth for an access control. The general feature of AAuth
is similar to Seive, but it does not provide direct revocation
and relies more parties to enforce the access control. For
example, when users want to decrypt the file in the cloud,
they need to be authorized from an authorizer (on behalf of
the data owner). The encrypted file is only accessible after
the successful authorization by the server.
9 Conclusion
We introduced a secure cloud storage system that offers a
fine-grained access control. Our access control mechanism
is cryptographically enforced by ABE. In particular, using
ABE with non-monotonic access structure, our system
offers a more flexible hybrid revocation scheme which is a
combination of both direct and indirect revocation
schemes. In addition, our system allows users to detect an
unauthorized modification of data using the signature
scheme. We also showed that our system is efficient
enough to use in practical applications. We plan to
implement the system in existing cloud storage applica-
tions like Google Drive, DropBox. In terms of the scheme,
our future plan is to further decentralize the role of
administrator so that we can update the files in the cloud in
an efficient manner.
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